Abstract: Based on regular trips to Afghanistan and
As a journalist, I speak here in the context of someone who has been traveling to Afghanistan for a long time, about the decade we have just been through, and about what it implies for our present concern with cultural learning and military activity and for the American footprint in the world in the near future. For my present comments, I will use Afghanistan as a touchstone and then look forward, moving out of Afghanistan to some other parts of the world to offer some further thoughts -and maybe some provocations.
In journalism, in reporting, when reporters talk to each other and they talk about going to a place like Afghanistan, one of the questions you will ask about a particular trip is, "Were you inside the wire or outside the wire?" Meaning: were you embedded in the military environment or were you on your own as a civilian. And I will use that framework to offer some initial comments about counterinsurgency and Afghanistan as something that we can then extrapolate from.
I will start with my own travel. On one of my trips to Afghanistan in 2011, I took a trip to Kandahar that I have reflected on for many reasons. It was at least the third time I had gone down to Kandahar. And in fact it may be the fourth or fifth. But there are three trips that I thought I would quickly highlight to try to get at the significance of what the wall between military footprints and civilian populations really feels like on the ground, and what its implications might be.
The first time I went down to Kandahar was in 1990. I was a Washington Post reporter then, and the government was ruled at that time by a former Communist secret police chief, who had managed to hang on after the Soviet troops left. And the principle objective of dealing with reporters who came into Kabul in those days was to make clear to them that the government of Afghanistan, such as it was, actually controlled the country. There would be maps up on the wall in briefing rooms: "We've just taken back that town or this road, " and so on. The journalists were typically pretty skeptical about these claims, since Soviet communication strategy was not very much accountable to factual reliability. So we always said, "Well, show us. " And occasionally they would say, "Okwe'll take you down. " I remember in particular that the government claimed it had just taken back the road between the Kandahar airport and the city. That road is often contested because it is a supply road. So, we went down in an Antinoff 1 -a group of four or five naïve young reporters. And this Soviet general with a big hat rolled us down in an armored personnel
